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THE 1978 MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDING ACT
"[A]ccess to the court of the United States is the most
effective means for citizens to participate directly in
environmental decisions and may be the only way to assure
that democratic processes are brought to bear on environmental problems."'
In 1978, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Environmental Standing Act 2 (ESA), which significantly expands the scope
of standing to sue in environmental matters. In establishing a new,
procedural process by which private parties, as well as public
officials, may participate in the important task of environmental
protection, the General Assembly followed precedent established in
at least ten other states 3 - notably Michigan, which enacted the
first legislation of this type. 4 Although the effect of the ESA is to
liberalize the federal standing requirements enumerated by the
United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton,5 it is,
nevertheless, significantly more limited in scope than comparable
6
statutory provisions in other states.
This article will briefly discuss the concept of standing and will
then analyze the provisions of the ESA, discuss how it changes
previous Maryland law, and compare its provisions with comparable
federal and Michigan law.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING CONCEPT

A.

Federal

7
Standing has been referred to as one of the most amorphous
8
concepts in law. Despite the many complexities and uncertainties

1. McGovern, Forward to J. SAx,

DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT at xii (1970).

2. Law of May 29, 1978, ch. 838, 1978 Md. Laws 2434 (codified at MD.NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-501 to-508 (Supp. 1978)). The Act took effect July 1, 1978.
3. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 12600-12612 (West Supp. 1978) (the attorney general
must maintain the action in the name of the people of the State of California);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to-20 (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412
(West 1973); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to 13-6-1-6 (Burns 1973); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West Supp. 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201
to-.1207 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01 to-.13 (West 1977); NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 41.540 to-.570 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1 to-14 (West Supp.
1978-79); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§34A-10-1 to-15 (1977).
4. Michigan's Environmental Protection Act has served as a model for other states
in the enactment of environmental legislation. See Ray v. Mason County Drain
Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 298, 224 N.W.2d 883, 887 (1975).

5. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See text accompanying notes 22-32 infra.
6. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§22a-14 to-20 (West 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 691.1201 to-.1207 (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1 to-14 (West
Supp. 1978-79).

7. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
8. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 151 (1970). ("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as
such.").
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attendant to the issue of standing, certain criteria have been
established by the United States Supreme Court.9 Although a
complete analysis of the federal rules of standing is beyond the scope
of this article, several basic concepts will be briefly discussed.
The concept of standing to sue emanates from the "case" or
"controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States
Constitution. 0 The basic consideration is whether the plaintiff is "a
proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not
whether the issue itself is justiciable."" I In short, a party must allege
"a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain
judicial resolution" of the controversy.' 2.The purpose of the standing
requirement is to ensure that courts will not have to decide cases of a
"hypothetical," "abstract,"13 or "ill-defined" 1 4 nature.
Federal standing requirements were established in Association
of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp,'5 in which

9. The Supreme Court demonstrated an inclination towards increasing liberalization of standing criteria between the years 1968-1973. See, e.g., United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Recent Supreme Court decisions have deviated from
this trend, however. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). For a discussion of the expansion and
contraction of the standing concept, see generally Broderick, The Warth Optional
Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 467
(1976); Note, Federal Standing: 1976, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383 (1976); Note, Recent
Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213
(1975); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970); see
also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 645-48 (1973).
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
'
11. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
(1968).) /11972
A TT100
0
r170,7
).
97l2.
1
12. Sierra Club v. orton, 405 .S. 727, 731
13. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
14. United States Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947).
15. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Although Data Processing serves as a basis for current
federal standing requirements, a brief discussion of several classic cases is
important in order to illustrate the development of the standing concept.
In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), one of the plaintiffs, a private
citizen, challenged the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921 as a taking
of property without due process. The plaintiff alleged that she was a taxpayer
and that the Act's appropriations would increase the burden of future taxation.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's mere status as a federal taxpayer
was insufficient to establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
federal statute. The Court held that the plaintiff must "[have] sustained or [be] in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of [the statute's]
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common
with people generally." Id. at 488.
Nearly forty years later, the Court held in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
that the plaintiff voters had sufficient standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the Tennessee Apportionment Act of 1901. The standard announced by the
Court is that a party who brings the action must allege "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
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the plaintiffs successfully challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of
the Currency that enabled national banks to provide data processing
services. 16 In Data Processing,the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Douglas, formulated a two-pronged test. 17 In order to
establish standing, a litigant must allege (1) that the challenged
action has caused him "injury in fact" ' and (2) that "the interest
sought to be protected. . . is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question."1 9 Although the plaintiffs in Data Processing sought
protection of economic interests, the Court emphasized that standing
may be based upon noneconomic values as well, including aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational interests2
Although Justice
Douglas's emphasis on these noneconomic values was dicta, a
foundation was nevertheless established upon which to base
21
standing to contest environmental issues.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.
21.

sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court . . . depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. at 204.
Finally, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), plaintiff taxpayers attacked
the expenditure of funds under the Federal Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 on the ground that it violated the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court departed from the
restrictive Frothingham rule and held that there is no absolute bar to suits by
federal taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of federal taxing and
spending programs. The Court established a more liberal standard whereby the
substantive issues in a case are to be examined in order to determine whether "a
logical nexus" exists between the status asserted by the plaintiff and the claim
sought to be adjudicated. Id. at 102.
In Data Processing,the plaintiffs sold data processing services to businesses in
the general marketplace. The suit challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the
Currency that enabled national banks to make data processing services
available to other banks and to bank customers.
In a recent case, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978), the Supreme Court further "refined" the criteria for
standing to require that the plaintiff establish "a distinct and palpable injury" to
himself and a "'fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury
and the challenged conduct." Id. at 2630. In addition there must be a substantial
likelihood that the exercise of the Court's remedial powers will redress the
claimed injuries. Id. at 2631. See also Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-62 (1977); Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37-42 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975).
397 U.S. at 152. The Court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the injury in fact
test by alleging that competition by national banks in the business of providing
data processing services might adversely affect their future profits and that
certain customers were being solicited away from them. Id.
Id. at 153. As competitors, the Court found that the plaintiffs were within the
zone of interests protected by the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864
(1976), which prohibits bank service corporations from engaging in any activities
other than performance of bank services for banks. 397 U.S. at 155-56.
Id. at 154.
In addition to judicially created standing requirements enumerated in Data
Processing, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1976), affords a statutory basis upon which a person who has been harmed by
federal agency action may rely in seeking judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)
states the following: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
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The Data Processing injury in fact requirement was applied to
an environmental controversy in Sierra Club v. Morton,2 2 and it
remains an important consideration in federal environmental
litigation.2 1 Sierra Club is indicative of the current view of the
Supreme Court, and has been cited frequently in subsequent
24
environmental cases in which the issue of standing was raised.
In Sierra Club, the plaintiff environmentalist group sought to
prevent the development of a ski resort and other commercial
projects in the Mineral King Valley, located in the Sierra Nevada
Mountains. The plaintiff sued as a membership corporation with a
"special interest in the conservation and sound maintenance of the
national parks, game refuges, and forests of the country. ' 25 While
the Supreme Court recognized that the alleged aesthetic and
ecological injuries were sufficiently important to warrant judicial

protection, the Court found that the plaintiff did not meet the
26
"injury in fact" test because it made no allegation in its complaint
of individualized harm to itself or its members. 2 7 In addition, the
Court stressed that Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members
would be affected directly by the proposed development, or that its
28
members actually used the Mineral King Valley for any purpose.

The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that it was
maintaining a public action and that standing should be afforded
29
through its capacity as a representative of the public interest.
Although the Court recognized the trend to broaden the categories of
injury that may be alleged in support of standing, it nevertheless
emphasized that the party seeking review must himself have
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4361 (1976), for example, is a
relevant statute within the "standing" section of 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). See United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 685-686 (1973).
22. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
23. See CCTW & M v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 452 F. Supp.
69, 74-75 (D.N.J. 1978). See also V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN, & S. DAVISON, 1
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
as YANNACONE, COHEN, & DAVISON].

447-55 (Supp. 1978). [hereinafter cited

24. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S. Ct.
2620, 2631 (1978); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 684-90 (1973); Clinton
Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medical Center, 374 F. Supp. 450,
454-56 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1048 (1975).
25. 405 U.S. at 730.
26. The Court did note that the plaintiff could amend its complaint under Rule 15 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 405 U.S. at 736 n.8.
27. Id. at 734-35.
28. Id. at 735.
29. Id. at 736. In so holding, the Court reversed the liberal trend of the lower federal
courts that afforded standing to certain groups as responsible representatives of
the public, even though there was no allegation of direct personal or economic
harm to the groups or their members. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens' Comm. For Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
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suffered injury. 3° The Court stated that the "mere 'interest in a
problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter
how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not
sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or
'aggrieved' within the meaning of the APA."'3 1 The Court concluded
that the purpose of judicial review is not to assist those who seek to
32
vindicate their own value preferences by use of the judicial process.
In summary, in order to seek successfully judicial review of an
environmental controversy in federal courts, the plaintiff must
satisfy a two-pronged test. He must first allege an injury in fact and
demonstrate a connection between the defendant's acts and the
environmental interest that he is seeking to protect. 33 To accomplish
this, the plaintiff should allege that he uses, or members of the
plaintiffs organization use, the area of the environment threatened
by the defendant's actions. Second, the plaintiff must allege that he
is within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated. In order to
satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff should allege that the
environmental interest that he is seeking to protect is within the
interests to be protected by an applicable environmental statute or
regulation and34 that the defendant is not complying with the
applicable law.
B. Maryland
Prior to the enactment of the Environmental Standing Act,
Maryland courts were in general accord with the Supreme Court
guidelines for standing enumerated in Data Processing and Sierra
Club. In Thomas v. Howard County,35 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered whether the plaintiff plumbers had standing
as taxpayers to sue Howard County and other defendants for willful
failure to enforce the Howard County Plumbing Code, thereby
causing health hazards and loss of revenue to the county. In
addition to their financial interest as taxpayers and their interest as
residents to be free of health hazards, the plaintiffs alleged that
their employment opportunities as plumbers were adversely af37
fected. 36 Citing with approval Data Processingand Flast v. Cohen,

30.
31.
32.
33.

405 U.S. at 738.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 740.
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2620,
2630 (1978). See also YANNACONE, COHEN, & DAVISON, note 23 supra, at 447-55
(Supp. 1978).

34. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 n.13 (1973). See also YANNACONE,
COHEN,

&

DAVISON,

note 23 supra, at 455-61 (Supp. 1978).

35. 261 Md. 422, 276 A.2d 49 (1971).
36. Id. at 424-25; 276 A.2d at 50-51.

37. See note 15 supra.
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the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs, having alleged a direct
and real interest in the matter in controversy, had standing to
maintain the suit.
In Kerpelman v. Board of Public Works, 38 the plaintiff, a
Baltimore City resident, brought suit on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated against the Board of Public Works of Maryland
and others seeking an injunction to require reconveyance of certain
lands located in Worcester County. The suit was brought in an
attempt to prevent probable adverse ecological effects that would
result from sale of the land by the county to two private
corporations. 39 The court of appeals first held that the plaintiff did
not have standing merely because of her taxpayer status. 40 It then
discussed the plaintiffs concern over the preservation of marshlands
and wetlands. It noted that the plaintiffs interest in the matter was
not alleged to be different from that generally of other citizens in the
state. The court found that in order for a person to challenge a
statute or the action of a public official acting under a statute, there
must be an allegation of a special interest rather than the mere
41
general interest of a member of the public.
II. THE MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING ACT
In 1973, the Maryland General Assembly declared environmental protection to be a policy of the state. The Maryland Environmental Policy Act 42 declares that "[e]ach person has a fundamental and
inalienable right to a healthful environment, and each person has a
responsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation, and
enhancement of the environment." 43 The General Assembly did not,
however, intend for this declaration to confer standing upon a
38. 261 Md. 436, 276 A.2d 56, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
39. The plaintiff alleged that the sale of two tracts of land to private corporations
was for an inadequate consideration considering the adverse ecological
consequences that would result from filling the wetlands, marshes, and shallows.
She further alleged that she and others similarly situated would be deprived of
the use of the land and that real estate taxes derived from the sale would not be

adequate compensation. Id. at 438-40, 276 A.2d at 57-59.
40. The court of appeals held that the plaintiff did not meet the standard enumerated
in Stovall v. Secretary of State, 252 Md. 258, 263, 250 A.2d 107, 110 (1969). "In
Maryland taxpayers have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute

when the statute as applied increases their taxes, but if they cannot show a

pecuniary loss or that the statute results in increased taxes to them, they have no
standing to make such a challenge." Id. The court stated that the effect of the

sale of the land would be to increase the tax base of the state so that the
plaintiff's taxes would be reduced. This case differs from Thomas where the
allegations on the face of the complaint indicated an increase of taxes payable

by the plaintiffs. 261 Md. at 444, 276 A.2d at 60-61.
41. 261 Md. at 443, 276 A.2d at 60. This requirement differs from the federal rule
enumerated in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) ("Standing is
not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury.").
42. MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1974).
43. Id. § 1-302(d).
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Maryland resident in order that he might fulfill this responsibility
through the judicial process. Rather, the General Assembly intended
the goals and purposes of the
state agencies to accomplish
44
Environmental Policy Act.
With the enactment of the 1978 Environmental Standing Act,
state agencies are no longer solely responsible for the "protection,
preservation, and enhancement" of the state's environment. Maryland has now entered a new era of direct private citizen and group
involvement in environmental protection. The General Assembly
has declared that "the courts of the State of Maryland are an
appropriate forum for seeking the protection of the environment and
that an unreasonably strict procedural definition of 'standing to sue'
in environmental matters is not in the public interest. '45 In
broadening the concept of standing to sue, the General Assembly
has extended the right of access to state courts to private individuals
and entities in order to ensure the enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations.
The Environmental Standing Act basically provides that the
State of Maryland, 46 any political subdivision, 47 and any other
person 48 may bring an action for equitable relief against any officer
or agency of the state or political subdivision for failure to perform a
nondiscretionary ministerial duty imposed by pertinent environmental law 49 or for neglect in enforcing an applicable environmental
quality standard. 50 The essential change from previous law is that
any person, regardless of whether he possesses a special interest
different from that possessed generally by Maryland residents or
whether substantial personal or property damage to him is

44. See Leatherbury v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367, 380-81, 347 A.2d 826, 834
(1975). The plaintiffs sought to have the prospective use of a quarry operation on
adjacent property declared a nuisance and to have its owners enjoined from
using the property for quarry purposes. They alleged that the Maryland
Environmental Policy Act, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-302(d) (1974), conferred

special standing upon them to sue. The court disagreed, and held that the
General Assembly did not intend to create new or enlarged actionable rights
under the statute and that the goals and purposes enumerated in the Act were to
be accomplished by state agencies only.
45. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-502 (Supp. 1978).

46. Id. § 1-503(a)(1). This section includes any agency or officer of the state, acting

through the Attorney General.
47. Id. § 1-503(a)(2). This section includes any agency or officer acting on behalf of

the political subdivision.
48. Id. § 1-503(a)(3). "Person," as defined in the Act, means "any resident of the

State of Maryland, any corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of
Maryland, or any partnership, organization, association, or legal entity doing

business in the State." Id. § 1-501(b).
49. Id. § 1-503(b). The duty may be imposed by an environmental statute, ordinance,
rule, regulation, or order.

50. Id. The standard may be expressed in a statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or
order of the state or any political subdivision.

418

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 8

threatened, 5 1 now has standing to bring an equitable action in order
to safeguard the environment. Although a number of limitations
have been incorporated into the legislation, it is, nevertheless, a
positive step forward in environmental protection.
The Maryland General Assembly had unsuccessfully attempted
to enact legislation of this type in the past.52 Business interests
traditionally have strongly opposed the liberalization of standing
concepts, and actively lobbied in an attempt to defeat this
legislation. 53 A primary objection to broad standing requirements is
that such provisions discourage business and thereby prohibit
economic growth and development. In addition, it has also been
argued that such a law would result in an influx of frivolous suits,
cause inevitable long-term delays in industrial and economic
projects, impair the powers and effectiveness of administrative
of the state political
boards and agencies, and weaken the authority
54
subdivisions to issue building permits.
As a result of the strong opposition to a broad definition of
standing to sue, the final version of the Environmental Standing Act
contains several limitations that may severely limit its ultimate
effectiveness. For example, while the ESA broadens the standing
concept by easing prior requirements, the General Assembly has
limited the class of persons against whom an action may be brought.
The original Senate Bill No. 942 contained a provision that
authorized a direct cause of action against any person presently or
prospectively engaged in a condition or activity that fails to meet
applicable environmental quality standards. 55 This provision was
51. The effect of § 1-503(a)(3) is to delete the injury in fact requirement enumerated
in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See text accompanying notes 22-32
supra. Likewise, the special interest in the subject matter requirement as
r')

expounded in Kerpelman has also been removed. See text accompanying notes
38-41
S. 117Q supra.
1......
S. 407 (......
. 195(1976).

53. Some of the opponents of the original Senate Bill 942 included the Maryland
Chamber of Commerce, the Maryland Farms Bureau, the State of Maryland
Institute of Home Builders, Inc., the Maryland Industrial Development
Association, and Anne Arundel Trade Counsel, Inc.
54. See, e.g., Statement by William F. Holin, representing the Maryland Chamber of
Commerce, to Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (March 8, 1978)
(unpublished-photocopy on file University of Baltimore Law Review office);
Letter from John N. Bowers, on behalf of State of Maryland Institute of Home
Builders, Inc. to Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (March 1, 1978)
(unpublished-photocopy on file University of Baltimore Law Review office).
55. The original S. 942 (1978) § 1-503(B) provided that,
Any person given standing by [the Act].. . may bring and maintain an
action against any other person who is causing, engaging in, or
maintaining, or is about to cause, engage in, or maintain, a condition or
activity which involves failure to meet an applicable environmental
quality standard for the protection of the air, water, or other natural
resources of the state, as expressed in a statute, ordinance, rule,
regulation, or order of the state, of any political subdivision, or of any
officer or agency of the state or political subdivision.
1978 Md. Laws 2436.
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deleted and the ESA now authorizes an action for mandamus or
equitable relief only against an officer or agency of the state or
political subdivision for failure to perform a nondiscretionary
ministerial duty or to enforce an applicable environmental quality
standard. The Act further provides that upon request of the
defendant officer or agency of the state or political subdivision, the
court may, in its discretion, join as a party defendant any person
against whom the plaintiff is requesting that action be taken,
56
following notice to that person.
One possible explanation for the limitation upon the class of
possible defendants in environmental suits is that the General
Assembly did not intend for the ESA to create any new substantive
cause of action not presently recognized by the courts of the state; it
merely sought to extend existing rights to new persons. 5 7 Although
the concept of standing is generally a procedural question relating to
who may assert a recognized legal right, the deleted provision may
have been interpreted as having conferred new substantive legal
rights to sue in connection with an alleged violation of any
environmental standard, where no such right previously existed. 58 In
any event, a plaintiff under the Act only has a cause of action
against an officer or agency of the state or any political subdivision.
The effect of this provision will be to place a greater burden on state
agencies and officials to fulfill adequately their nondiscretionary
duties and responsibilities or face the possibility of court action.
The Environmental Standing Act includes several other limitations upon the plaintiff's statutory authority to maintain environmental actions in court. The original bill required only that an
individual citizen reside in the State of Maryland. 59 This requirement was amended to provide that "an individual citizen either shall
reside in the county or Baltimore City where the action is brought, or
shall demonstrate that the alleged condition, activity, or failure
complained of affects the environment where he resides." 60 When
read in accordance with the venue requirement that the action is to
be brought in the circuit court where the alleged violation has, or is
likely to occur,6 ' it becomes evident that a major limitation has been
placed upon when and where a private citizen may initiate an
action. It is possible that although the General Assembly sought to
56. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-503(b) (Supp. 1978).
57. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-504(a) (Supp. 1978).

58. The State of Maryland Institute of Home Builders, Inc., for example, argued that
the original S. 942, which contained the provision referred to in note 55 supra,

conferred substantive rights that had previously not existed. See Letter from
John N. Bowers, State of Maryland Institute of Home Builders, Inc. to Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee (March 1, 1978) (unpublished-photocopy on file
University of Baltimore Law Review office).
59. S. 942 (1978) §§ 1-501(B) & 1-503(A)(3), 1978 Md. Laws 2435-36.
60. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-503(a)(3) (Supp. 1978).
61. Id. § 1-505(a).
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enable a resident of a particular subdivision to protect his local
environment, it did not intend to confer the unrestricted authority to
protect the environment of the entire state by use of the state courts.
Another limitation of the ESA is that a plaintiff may not recover
monetary damages but rather is limited to obtaining an injunction
or other equitable relief to halt environmental damage. 62 Therefore,
there is no direct monetary incentive for a plaintiff to sue.
Additionally, the ESA does not abrogate the existing requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies; 63 a plaintiff may use the
courts only after all other channels of statutory or regulatory relief
have been explored.6 4 Finally, the ESA provides that if a party is
determined to have brought the action "in bad faith or solely for the
purposes of harassment or delay," the defendant may recover court
costs, attorneys fees, witness fees, and damages 65 incurred as a

62. Id. § 1-504(c). This subsection, however, does not preclude an award of monetary
damages in any action in which a judgment is appropriate to a plaintiff who has
standing to sue other than by virtue of the provision of the ESA.
63. Id. § 1-504(d). This provision adheres to the general rule that where an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, that remedy must be pursued and
exhausted before the party may proceed in court. See Leatherbury v. Gaylord
Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367, 373, 347 A.2d 826, 830 (1975). The judicial review section
of Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255(a)
(1978), provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by a final decision in a contested
case, whether such decision is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to
judicial review thereof under this subtitle." The authority of the Board of Review
of the Department of Natural Resources, for example, is established by MD. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 1-106 (Supp. 1978). Any person aggrieved by action or
inaction on the part of the Secretary of Natural Resources or any unit within
that department is entitled to appeal to the Board of Review. Prior to the
commencement of the appeal, the person must set forth the basis of his
complaint to the individual responsible for the improper conduct and make a
request for review. If satisfactory resolution has not occurred within thirty days,
an appeal may be taken. The decision of the Board shall be the final decision for
purposes of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. § 1-107.
Similar procedures have been established for appeals to the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene in MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§206A-206B (Supp.
1978).
64. Another procedural requirement of the ESA is that if the plaintiff is a person
other than the state, written notice of the alleged condition, activity, or failure
must be delivered to the appropriate agency and to the Attorney General at least
thirty days prior to the commencement of the action. Id. § 1-505(b). The purpose
of this provision may be to permit the defendant to cure his violation, thus
precluding the necessity for litigation.
65. Id. § 1-507(a). The provision allowing damages to the defendant is an
amendment to the original S. 942. The provision may have been added to
appease business opponents of the bill. For example, William F. Holin,
representing the Maryland Chamber of Commerce wrote:
While the bill provides for possible reimbursement of legal expenses to a
defendant if it can be clearly shown an action is brought solely in bad
faith or for harassment or delay no provision is made for making up the
tremendous losses that would occur by delay of the project. Time is
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result of the action. 66 These provisions were incorporated primarily
to ensure that only persons with legitimate complaints can maintain
an action in court.
In addition to the limitations imposed upon a plaintiff, the ESA
also includes several defenses that may be raised by a defendant. No
relief may be granted if the defendant can prove that the condition,
activity, or failure complained of is pursuant to and in compliance
with a valid permit issued by an agency of the United States, the
State of Maryland or a political subdivision thereof. Likewise, the
defendant may successfully defend upon proving that he is acting in
compliance with an order or other adjudication of a court of
competent jurisdiction.

67

III. COMPARISON TO FEDERAL LAW
There is no comparable environmental standing legislation on
the federal level. In 1970, Senators George McGovern and Philip
Hart introduced the Environmental Protection Act.6 s This proposed
legislation embodied the principles of increased citizen participation
in environmental protection as enumerated in the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act.69 The Act would have given any
person the right to maintain an action on his own behalf or on
behalf of those similarly situated for the protection of the environment "from unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction
which results from or reasonably may result from any activity which
affects interstate commerce."' 7
Although the proposed bill, which sought to establish broad
standing requirements for environmental actions, was not enacted,
several federal statutes do provide specific, automatic standing
provisions. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,71 for instance,
contains limited provisions for environmental standing. Section
1365 establishes citizen participation in the enforcement of control
money in these cases and losses can amount to millions of dollars a day
on major private or public projects.
Statement by William F. Holin to Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (March
8, 1978) (unpublished-photocopy on file University of Baltimore Law Review
office).
66. The General Assembly made no provision in the ESA for recovery of court costs,
attorneys fees, witness fees, and damages by the plaintiff.
67. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-504(f)(1) (Supp. 1978).

68. S. 3575, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 6578-82 (1970). Similar legislation
was introduced in the House of Representatives by Morris Udall. H.R. 16,436,

91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 6876 (1970).
69. McGovern, Foreword to J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT at xiii (1970). See
text accompanying notes 78-87 infra.

70. S.3575 §3(a), 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 6580 (1970).
71. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). See also Clean Air Act and Air Quality Act of
1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1976) as amended by Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 139. 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1976) includes provisions for citizen suits.
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requirements and regulations created in the Act.7 2 It should be noted
that in drafting the legislation, Congress specifically examined the
possibility of overturning the Sierra Club v. Morton 73 standing
requirements, but declined to do so.7 4 In the 1972 Amendments,

Congress adhered to the Sierra Club holding by defining "citizen" as
"a person or persons having an interest which is or may be
affected. '7 5 Hence, the broad provisions in the Senate Bill that would
have permitted
anyone to initiate a civil action against a violator
76
were rejected.

IV. COMPARISON TO MICHIGAN LAW
As a result of the Environmental Standing Act, Maryland is
more liberal than the federal government in terms of environmental
standing requirements. The ESA is, however, substantially more
restrictive in scope than environmental standing statutes enacted in
other states.

77

Michigan was the first state to break down traditional standing
barriers and give private citizens the opportunity to take the
initiative in environmental law enforcement.7 8 Previously, this
responsibility had been left exclusively to state regulatory agencies.7 9 According to Michigan's governor at the time the Environmental Protection Act of 197080 (EPA) was enacted, the purpose of
the legislation is to permit direct citizen involvement and to increase
consciousness concerning the protection and preservation of the

72. Unlike Maryland's ESA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976) provides for a cause of action
against the actual wrongdoer, as well as against the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency for the failure to perform a nondiscretionary
act or duty under the Water Pollution Control Act. See text accompanying notes
55-58 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra.
74. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §505, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 3668, 3744-47; S. CON. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3776, 3822-23 ("It is the
understanding of the conferees that the conference substitute relating to the
definition of the term 'citizen' reflects the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the case of Sierra Club v. Morton.").
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1976).
76. Note, however, that the citizen suits section of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-2 (1970) does not separately define the term "citizen." This section does
not require compliance with federal standing requirements such as the injury in
fact test enumerated in Sierra Club. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165,
172-73 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Metropolitan Washington
Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C, Cir. 1975).
77. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §22a-16 (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.412(2) (West 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-4 (West Supp. 1978).
78. See note 4 supra.
79. See Sax & Conner, Michigan's EnvironmentalProtectionAct of 1970: A Progress
Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1004 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SAX & CONNER].
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§691.1201 to -. 1207 (Supp. 1978).
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environment. 81 The Michigan Act authorizes any person 2 to bring
an action for declaratory and equitable relief against either a public
agency or a private person or entity8 3 "for the protection of the air,
water, and other natural resources and the public trust therein from
84
pollution, impairment or destruction."
Upon the plaintiffs prima facie showing that "the defendant
has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other
natural resources or the public trust therein,"85 the defendant may
show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no viable
alternative to his conduct and that such conduct is consistent with
the state's paramount concern for the protection of its environment.
The EPA also provides that if regulatory proceedings are available
to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court may,
but is not compelled to, remit the parties to such proceedings. 86 In
any event, the court may grant temporary equitable relief when
87
necessary.
Maryland's ESA is too recent to have been extensively analyzed
and interpreted. Michigan's EPA, however, has been in existence for
nine years and, consequently, its provisions have been analyzed and
its effect upon the state has been studied.

The Environmental Protection Act was cited with approval by
the Supreme Court of Michigan in Eyde v. State.8 8 In that case the

court stated that "[t]he EPA is significant legislation which gives
the private citizen a sizeable share of the initiative for environmental law enforcement. The Act creates an independent cause of action,

81. Press release, Governor William G. Milliken (March 31, 1970), reprinted in
Thibodeau, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or
Pandora's Box?, 48 J. URBAN L. 579, 598 (1971).
82. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1978) provides that "[t]he attorney
general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of
the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership,
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an
action ...... Unlike the Maryland ESA § 1-501(b), Michigan's EPA has no
requirement that a corporation must be incorporated under the laws of the state
in order to maintain an action.
83. Micit. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1978) provides that an action may
be brought "against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person,
partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity .. " In
short, any person or entity that is empowered to bring an action under the
statute can also be a defendant.

84. Id.
85. Id. § 691.1203(1). The phraseology of the statute enables the courts to develop a
common law of environmental quality. This result was specifically intended by
the Michigan Legislature. Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294,
304, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 (1975).
86. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(2).
87. Id. §691.1204(1).
88. 393 Mich. 453: 225 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
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granting standing to private individuals to maintain actions ...
against anyone for the protection of Michigan's environment."8 9
In addition to judicial discussion and approval, comprehensive
follow-up studies on the effect of the Michigan EPA have been
conducted 0 These studies provide insight into the possible effect
that Maryland's more restrictive statute might have on the state. 91
Since the enactment of the statute, several studies have shown
that there has been no resulting flood of environmental litigation in
Michigan. 92 Suits have varied widely in character 93 with state and
local officials, citizens' groups, established environmental organizations, and property owners with standing under conventional
riparian or nuisance actions being the most active users of the
EPA. 94 As in Maryland, business and industrial opponents argued
that the ESA would cause a decrease in investor confidence in
Michigan industry, resulting in industrial curtailment and loss of
jobs. In response to this contention, the Michigan House of
Representatives declared that "[o]ther investors have not neglected
Michigan industry because of the threats of lawsuits under the EPA.
. . .There is no evidence that the EPA has cost jobs in Michigan,
down or moved from
and in no case has an industrial plant closed
'95
lawsuit.
EPA
an
of
result
a
as
Michigan
In an analysis of the EPA in its sixth year, it was emphasized
that the success of the Act was due in large part to direct citizen
involvement. 96 Citizens have contributed to the growth of environmental protection without harassing industry or clogging the
courts. 97 Due to the high level of citizen concern, public officials have

89. Id. at 454, 225 N.W.2d at 2. See also Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393
Mich. 294, 303, 224 N.W.2d 883, 887 (1975); Michigan State Highway Comm'n v.
Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 184, 220 N.W.2d 416, 427 (1974); Wayne County Dept.
of Health v. Olsonite Corp., 79 Mich. App. 668, 690, 263 N.W.2d 778, 790 (1978),
90. See SAX & CONNER, note 79 supra;Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits:
Three Years Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4
ECOLOGY

91.

92.

93.
94.
95.
96.

L.Q. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as

SAX

&

DIMENTO];

Haynes,

Michigan's Environmental Protection Act in Its Sixth Year: Substantive Law
From Citizen Suits, 53 J. URBAN L. 589 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HAYNES].
Similar studies have been made on the effect of environmental standing
legislation in other states. See DiMento, Citizen Environmental Legislation in
the States: An Overview, 53 J. URBAN L. 413 (1976), which indicates that the
conclusions of the Michigan studies are not unique.
In the first sixteen months following the enactment of the Michigan EPA, one
study indicated that only thirty-six cases were filed pursuant to the EPA, and
those were distributed evenly at a rate of two to three per month. SAX & CONNER,
note 79 supra, at 1007. By 1976, only 119 cases or administrative proceedings had
relied on the EPA (approximately 600,000 civil cases were initiated in Michigan
Circuit Courts during the period). HAYNES, note 90 supra, at 593.
SAX & CONNER, note 79 supra, at 1008.
HAYNES, note 90 supra, at 645.
Michigan House of Representatives, Analysis of S.B. 1003, at 2 (Aug. 4, 1975),
reprinted in HAYNES, note 90 supra, at 669.
HAYNES, note 90 supra, at 673.

97. Id. at 672.
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made great use of the Act, and agency awareness has increased. 98
Finally, it should be noted that as a result of the EPA, defendants
have rarely contested the plaintiff's standing 99 and courts have been
very liberal in allowing intervention and joinder in these actions.1i°
As previously indicated, Michigan's EPA is much broader than
the comparable Maryland Environmental Standing Act. The most
significant difference between the statutes is the class of persons
who may be cited as defendants in environmental litigation. The
provision in Maryland's ESA that permits the plaintiff to bring suit
only against an officer or agency of the state or political subdivision 10 1 is much more restrictive than Michigan's EPA, which allows
the plaintiff to bring suit against the state or directly against the
actual wrongdoer. 1 2 The Maryland Act further restricts a plaintiff
by requiring (1) that the plaintiff live in the county where the alleged
violation is occurring or demonstrate that the alleged violation is
damaging the environment where he resides, and (2) that the
plaintiff bring the action in the county where the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur. 103 The Michigan statute merely requires
that the action be brought where the violation occurred or is likely to
occur. 10 4 Similarly, if the plaintiff in Maryland is a corporation, it

must be incorporated within the state. 10 5 No such limitation is
explicitly stated in the Michigan law. 10 6 It should also be noted that
the Maryland ESA requires that the complainant must have
exhausted all administrative remedies before an action may be
brought in court.107 Again, the Michigan EPA is more liberal in that
it permits a party to initiate court action on matters cognizable
before administrative agencies without having first exhausted the
administrative remedy. 10 8 The EPA provision is flexible in that a
judge before whom the suit is brought may decide whether to hear
the case immediately or rdturn it for administrative action. 10 9
The two acts also differ in the approach taken to protect the
defendant's interest. The Michigan EPA provides that the court may
order the plaintiff to post a surety bouid or cash not to exceed
$500.00.110 While no such provision exists in the ESA, Maryland's
Act does contain a safeguard provision against suits brought in bad
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 673.
Id. at 644.
SAX & DIMENTO, note 90 supra, at 36.
MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-503(b) (Supp. 1978).
See note 83 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
104. MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §691.1202(1) (Supp. 1978).
105. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-501(b) (Supp. 1978).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §691.1202(1) (Supp. 1978).
See note 63 supra.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §691.1204(2) (Supp. 1978).
SAX & CONNER, note 79 supra, at 1020.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §691.1202(a) (Supp. 1978).
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faith under which a defendant may recover court costs, attorneys
fees, witness fees, and damages.1 1 '
A Maryland defendant is afforded greater latitude in his actions
than one similarly situated in Michigan. Under the Maryland ESA,
a defendant is protected as long as he acts pursuant to a valid
legislative permit or court order. 2 The EPA, however, also requires
that a defendant prove that there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the conduct in question and that he has acted
consistently with the promotion of the public health, safety, and
welfare." 3 The Michigan statute is, therefore, much more stringent.
Finally, the ESA specifically provides that the statute creates no
new substantive cause of action or theory of recovery." 4 The Act is
specifically intended as a procedural expansion of the standing
concept in environmental litigation. Michigan's EPA, on the other
hand, is not specifically limited to procedural considerations. The
15
EPA itself has been interpreted as a source of substantive law
making it unlawful "to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water and
other natural resources or the public trust therein" 1 6 unless no
acceptable alternatives exist that are consistent with public
environmental policy. This consideration becomes important when
the defendant contends that in light of the challenged activities he
has no obligation to take environmental considerations into ac117
count.
V. CONCLUSION
The Maryland Environmental Standing Act is a watered-down
version of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act and similar
statutes enacted in other states. Although the ESA changes the
narrow interpretation of standing previously existing in Maryland,
it nevertheless limits a person's ability to protect environmental
(Supp. 1978).
112. Id. § 1-504(f)(1).
113. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203(1) (Supp. 1978).
111. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-507(a)

114. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-504(a) (Supp. 1978).

115. In Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 184, 220
N.W.2d 416, 428 (1974), the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that

EPA is designed to accomplish two distinct results:
(a) to provide a procedural cause of action
Michigan's natural resources; and

for protection of

(b) to prescribe the substantive environmental rights, duties, and
functions of subject entities.
(emphasis in original). See also HAYNES, note 90 supra, at 597 & 644.
116. See note 85 supra. In addition, the EPA specifically supplements existing
administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 691.1206 (Supp. 1978). The statute, therefore, provides a cause of action
for a party who faces an environmental problem that does not fall within the
established jurisdiction of an administrative agency. See HAYNES, note 90 supra,
at 602.
117. SAX & CONNER, note 79 supra, at 1055.
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interests. It is evident that the intent of the General Assembly was
not to give ordinary citizens a free hand in initiating environmental
law enforcement. It merely determined that an unreasonably strict
procedural definition of standing to sue is not in the public's best
interest.
The ESA appears to have been drafted in response to specific
fears and criticisms expounded by opponents to a broad interpretation of environmental standing. As stated earlier, the limitations
that have been incorporated into the Environmental Standing Act
serve to ensure that only persons with valid environmental
complaints will be able to maintain a court action. Strict compliance
by persons who utilize the statute will almost certainly be required.
Based upon the results of reliable studies that have been conducted
in jurisdictions with broader statutes, it would appear that
restrictions such as citizen residency requirements and limitations
upon the proper party to sue have been unnecessarily incorporated
into the Act.
As enacted, the Environmental Standing Act may be viewed as
a compromise. While it certainly does not contain the broad
provisions recommended by environmentalists, it does provide a
cause of action for certain parties who might otherwise be excluded
from the judicial system. It is difficult to determine exactly how
useful the Environmental Standing Act will be in protecting
Maryland's environment. The courts will make that ultimate
determination.
Kim R. Siegert

I

ANNOUNCEMENT
We have purchased the
entire back stock and
reprint rights ofUNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE
LAW REVIEW

Complete sets to date
are now available. We
can also furnish single
volumes and issues.

WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC.
1285 Main Street
Buffalo, New York 14209

